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1. Introduction 
Modern democracy is not a simple and immediate 
realisation of an abstract idea of democracy2. After the 
experiences of World War Two ‘what emerged instead 
might best be described as a new balance of democracy and 
liberal principles, and constitutionalism in particular, but 
with both liberalism and democracy redefined in the light of 
the totalitarian experience of midtwentieth-century 
Europe’3. The model of democracy functioning in the so-
called western states can be defined after F. Fukuyama as a 
combination of the principle of democratic accountability 
and participation, and the liberal principles of the rule of law 
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2 Cf. R. A. Dahl, On Democracy, New Haven-London 1998, pp. 35-43, 84-99. 
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and the guarantee of individual rights4. The combination of 
these principles would constitute a systemic optimum for 
which no other alternative is available, as it closely links 
both institutional rationality and political legitimisation. In 
other words, liberal democracy is interpreted as ‘the end of 
history’, i.e. an optimal combination of principles and 
institutions5. And although the development of political 
orders is neither linear nor completely determined when it 
comes to the direction it follows, at the level of ideas liberal 
democracy is seen as the culmination of humanity's search 
for ‘the ideal system of government’. Thus, it would offer a 
solution to the problem identified by I. Kant: ‘the highest 
task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that 
of establishing a society in which freedom under external 
laws would be combined to the greatest possible extent with 
irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly 
just civil constitution’6. 
The purpose of this article is to attempt to answer the 
question whether the combination of liberal 
constitutionalism and democracy is accidental, or whether it 
is possible to observe an important connection between the 
two elements. In the first part I discuss the so-called 
democratic paradox resulting from the tension between the 
principle of democratic self-determination and liberal 
limitations connected with the rule of law and the guarantees 
of the rights of an individual. Indeed, modern democracy is 
                                                          
4 Cf. F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York-Toronto 
1992, p. 42 et seq. 
5 Ibid., p. xii. 
6 I. Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, [in:] I. 
Kant, Political Writings, trans. B. Nisbet, Cambridge-New York-Port Chester-
Melbourne-Sydney 2003, pp. 45-46. 
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a mixed system consisting of democratic procedures 
contained in the constitutional framework of the 
representative system. Part two of the article deals with the 
tension between radically understood democracy and 
constitutionalism. From the point of view of democracy as 
such, any – also constitutional – limitation of the democratic 
will is seen as undemocratic. Is constitutionalism therefore 
irreconcilable with democracy? In the third part I point to 
such an understanding of constitutional liberalism as 
emphasises the role of civil rights as constitutive elements 
of the democratic system. In this approach, liberal 
constitutionalism is a form of reinforcement of civic 
subjectivity. Liberal constitutional rights are to facilitate 
democratic participation and the protection of pluralism. 
Thus, an affirmation of pluralism leads to perceiving liberal 
constitutionalism as being closely related to democracy. 
 
2. The paradoxical nature of liberal democracy  
The combination of the two traditions of liberalism and 
democracy does not need to be seen as indispensable or 
inevitable. ‘On one side we have the liberal tradition 
constituted by the rule of law, the defence of human rights, 
and the respect of individual liberty; on the other the 
democratic tradition whose main ideas are those of equality, 
identity between governing and governed, and popular 
sovereignty. There is no necessary relation between those 
two distinct traditions, but only a contingent historical 
articulation’.7. According to Ch. Mouffe, contemporary 
liberal democracies not so much as combine the above two 
principles as rather subject democracy to liberal principles. 
                                                          
7 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, London-New York 2000, p. 2-3. 
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They are characterised by a democratic deficit by 
accentuating the idea of the rule of law and the rights of the 
individual at the expense of the idea of sovereignty of the 
people. ‘For people in the West – as F. Zakaria writes – 
democracy means 'liberal democracy': a political system 
marked not only by free and fair elections but also by the 
rule of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of 
basic liberties of speech, assembly, religion, and property’8. 
Here, on the other hand, democracy is understood in a 
narrow procedural sense as a process of selection of the 
‘governing’9. From such a point of view, the system 
opposite to liberal democracy, i.e. the so-called illiberal 
democracy, would also be affected by a deficit, only of a 
different kind. Illiberal democracy would constitute a 
political system allowing for free and fair elections, 
however exhibiting a deficit in the area of the rule of law 
and the division of powers, thus failing to ensure protection 
of the fundamental freedoms of speech, association, 
religion, and property. Assuming the position of Ch. Mouffe 
one may say that the choice of a particular model of liberal 
or illiberal democracy entails a deficit in the sphere of 
democracy or liberalism. Mouffe argues that the tension 
between liberalism and democracy is permanent and a full 
reconciliation of these elements is impossible10. Any 
interpretation of the above two components of modern 
democracy points to a specific hegemony that is not ‘natural 
and alternativeless’ and that can be questioned.  
                                                          
8 F. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, New York-London 2007, p. 17. 
9 Cf. Ibid., pp. 18-19. Cf. the topic of procedural democracy D. Held, Models of 
Democracy, Cambridge 2008, pp. 125-157; cf. also A. Przeworski, Democracy 
and the Limits of Self-Government, New York 2010, pp. 111-112. 
10 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 5. 
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A specific threat to democracy is seen in such a form 
of hegemony as negates the dispute between liberal freedom 
and democratic equality11 that is inscribed in the essence of 
democracy and presents itself as the ‘ultimate and natural’ 
form of democratic policy. Its negative effect rests in the 
fact that the possible claims against the current status quo 
are interpreted as anti-democratic, which allows anti-
democratic forces to take them over and direct them not 
towards current hegemony, but against ‘democracy in 
general’. From this perspective, the threat to democracy 
consists in the elimination of antagonisms from the forum 
of democratic policy and placing an exaggerated emphasis 
on the role of deliberation and agreement. Indeed, the nature 
of democratic policy in Mouffe's view is paradoxical and 
should be understood ‘not as the search for an inaccessible 
consensus – to be reached through whatever procedure – but 
as an 'agonistic confrontation' between conflicting 
interpretations of the constitutive liberal-democratic 
values’12. Assuming that Ch. Mouffe's observations are 
correct one may ask whether from the paradoxical nature of 
democratic policy it results that the perspective of 
a ’procedure-based consensus’ should be abandoned in 
favour of ‘agonistics’, or whether what is meant is an 
establishment of a certain form of a balance between them? 
                                                          
11 P. Rosanvallon also notes that the development of modern democracy 
involves an ‘inversely proportional’ development of the importance of political 
and social citizenship, the people in a political and social sense. ‘The 'people', 
understood in a political sense as a collective entity that ever more powerfully 
imposes its will, is less and less a 'social body'. Political citizenship has 
progressed, while social citizenship has regressed’, P. Rosanvallon, The Society 
of Equals, trans. A. Goldhammer, Cambridge–London 2013, p. 1. The process 
of extension of democratic rights would occur at the expense of democratic 
equality. 
12 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 9. 
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Is such a balance at all possible? Does the antagonism that 
makes every agreement inconclusive and impermanent 
mean that any form of policy regulation through liberal 
principles threatens an expression of various positions and 
political postulates? In other words, does liberal 
constitutionalism suppress pluralism or rather establish the 
framework for its peaceful coexistence? 
With respect to the objectives of governance (goals 
of political power) constitutional liberalism means the 
defence of individual autonomy and dignity against 
arbitrary coercion (e.g. social, public or ecclesiastical). It is 
therefore related to a limitation of political power. ‘For to us 
'constitution' means – as Sartori writes – a frame of political 
society, organised through and by the law, for the purpose 
of restraining arbitrary power’13. In Zakaria's interpretation, 
‘liberal constitutionalism’ is liberal because it affirms the 
value of individual freedom, it is constitutional, as it ‘places 
the rule of law in the centre of policy’14. In liberal 
constitutionalism, the division of powers, equal justice 
under law, independent judiciary, the separation of state and 
church are to serve the protection of fundamental freedoms 
of individuals (freedom of speech, assembly, religion, 
property rights...) which are treated as ‘inborn and 
inalienable’. Contemporary western democracies are not 
‘pure democracies’, but are rather an example of a ‘mixed 
system’ where non-elected institutions operate alongside 
democratic institutions. This results from the conviction that 
‘more democracy’ does not automatically lead to ‘more 
                                                          
13 G. Sartori, Constitutionalism: A Preliminary Discussion, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1962, p. 860. 
14 F. Zakaria, The Future of Freedom, p. 19. 
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freedom’15. Modern liberal democracy, in addition to the 
mechanisms and institutions that enable the implementation 
of the principle of self-government (or self-determination), 
introduces mechanisms and institutions that implement the 
principle of self-control, which has an inhibitory effect on 
the political power and secures the rights of individuals 
against their violation, as well as stabilising the political 
system by making its functioning independent of variable 
‘social moods’, fluctuations of public opinion, or self-
proclaimed ‘spokesmen of the people’16. Institutions 
resulting from the rule of law (e.g. independent courts, 
public services, supervisory institutions) are to have positive 
effects, not only on the stability, but also on the 
effectiveness of the political system, the quality of 
governance, and are to ensure protection against excessive 
informal influences of interest groups on the functioning of 
public institutions17. 
 The question arises whether the principle of self-
control is not too restrictive for the democratic ideal of self-
determination? ‘The ideal of self-determination – as H. 
Kelsen puts it – requires that the social order shall be created 
by the unanimous decision of all its subjects’18. In the 
original form the idea of self-determination does not permit 
diversity and conflict of opinion, and a lack of agreement 
                                                          
15 Cf. Ibid., p. 26. 
16 Cf. J.-W. Müller, Contesting Democracy…, pp. 146 et seq. 
17 Cf. F. Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay. From the Industrial 
Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, New York 2014, chapters 1, 13, 
27, 36. 
18 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, trans. A. Wedberg, Cambridge 
1949, p. 285. On the transformation of the idea of self-determination into the 
idea of a representative government, cf. also A. Przeworski, Democracy..., pp. 
17 et seq. 
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with a ‘unanimous decision’ would mean an exclusion from 
society. The principle of a priori unanimity excludes the 
possibility of disagreement. Any change of a unanimously 
established order would be impossible as the groups or 
individuals that defy a particular shape of social order would 
actually resign from being part of it. In practice this kind of 
idea is virtually unworkable if we take into account the 
many forms of social diversification. Attempts at its 
implementation may take a distorted form of obtaining 
unanimity with the use of insistent propaganda and 
coercion. However, this would be a ghastly caricature of 
unanimity as an expression of self-determination. In 
practice unanimity is unattainable. This does not mean that 
the principle of self-determination is impossible to 
implement. The possibility of its fulfilment involves a 
limitation of its applicability: not ‘everyone’, but the 
‘majority’ should define the content of the legal order. The 
principle underlying majority rule is that ‘social order shall 
be in concordance with as many subjects as possible, and in 
discordance with as few as possible’19. Thus, the majority 
rule ensures political freedom to the maximum extent 
possible, i.e. self-determination, as the compliance of the 
will of the individual with the common will. ‘Theoretically, 
democracy is a political or social form in which the will of 
society or – less figuratively – the social order is generated 
by its subjects, the People. Democracy means that the leader 
and those who are led, that the Subject and Object of rule, 
are identical. It means the rule of the People over itself’.20. 
                                                          
19 H. Kelsen, General Theory..., p. 286. 
20 H. Kelsen, The Essence and Value of Democracy, trans. B. Graf, Lanham-
Boulder-New York-Toronto-Plymouth 2013, p. 35. 
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However, the complexity of modern societies as well as 
their greatness causes that direct participation of citizens in 
law-making is practically impossible. Just as the division of 
labour has become indispensable in the economic reality, it 
has also proved necessary in the political sphere. 
Democratic self-determination is in fact implemented in the 
form of participation in the procedure of nominating 
individuals to legislative bodies, i.e. mainly through the 
participation in the elections. ‘The organ authorised to 
create or execute the legal norms is elected by those subjects 
whose behaviour is regulated by these norms’21. 
Contemporary democracy assumes the form of an indirect, 
representative democracy, where individuals selected for a 
particular assembly are treated as representatives of the 
voters22. 
 
3. Constitutionalism versus strong democracy  
The constitution of any institution, as E.-J. Sieyès claims, 
endows it with an organisational framework, forms, and 
laws allowing it to fulfil the functions it was established to 
perform. A representative institution cannot exist without 
a constitution, i.e. an establishment of a representative 
institution is possible only by its appointment in the 
constitution. ‘Thus the body of representatives entrusted 
with the legislative power, or the exercise of the common 
will, exists only by way of the mode of being which the 
                                                          
21 H. Kelsen, General Theory..., p. 289.  
22 R. Dahl notes that the transformation of democracy from direct to 
representative has enabled the implementation of the idea of democracy in large 
and complex societies. Cf. R. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics, New Haven 
1989, chapter 15. G. Sartori defines the principle of representation as an 
‘intermediate principle’ between the political ideal and reality, G. Sartori, 
Theory of Democracy Revisited, Chatham 1987, chapter 4.5. 
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nation decided to give it. It is nothing without its constitutive 
forms; it acts, proceeds, or commands only by way of those 
forms’23. The said ‘constitutive forms’ establish a 
representative institution, define its functions and the 
manner of conduct and scope of its activities. Without the 
above constitution, the institution has neither authority nor 
competence, and therefore no basis for being both 
a representative and a legislative institution. The 
‘constitutive forms’ are to ensure protection against an 
arbitrary attribution of power and any exceeding of the 
entrusted competences. This way, the nation protects its 
‘common will’ against an abuse of ‘common representative 
will’. The nation is a ‘constituent power’ (pouvoir 
constituant) that defines the fundamental norms for the 
functioning of political institutions. The norms defining the 
organisations and functioning of the political institutions 
within a representative system (legislative and executive 
power) constitute positive constitutional law, which is 
fundamental with regard to ‘constituted power’ (pouvoir 
constitué) and is completely dependent on constituent 
power. ‘The nation exists prior to everything; it is the origin 
of everything. Its will is always legal. It is the law itself’24. 
Constituted power (representative system) is in fact an 
authority delegated by constituent power (nation). A 
delegated authority cannot change the terms of its 
delegation. The will of constituent power is unlimited, 
whereas constituted power is limited by the ‘terms of 
delegation’. From the perspective of Sieyès' theory, the role 
                                                          
23 E.-J. Sieyès, What Is the Third Estate? in E.-J. Sieyès, Political Writings. 
Including the Debatte between Sieyès and Tom Paine in 1791, trans. M. 
Sonenscher, Indianapolis-Cambridge 2003, p. 135. 
24 Ibid., p. 136. 
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of the constitution consists in defining the principles and 
rules of functioning of legislative and executive power. The 
nation itself is not subject to the constitution, as it is a natural 
being and a source of positive law, whilst the existence of 
political institutions depends on the fundamental positive 
law (norms of the constitutional law).  
Sieyès' concept may constitute a kind of a model for 
the theory of the unlimited sovereignty of a nation: a nation 
(constituent power) ontologically precedes constituted 
political institutions and in that sense is independent of 
positive law. Positive law cannot constitute a nation, yet 
without a nation there is no positive law. Similarly, positive 
law cannot bestow on the nation rights that it no longer 
possesses (we may say that it may only declare them). 
Delegated power is fully dependent on the nation, and 
therefore it cannot award it with anything that it no longer 
possesses. Constituted power is subject to the constitution 
established by unlimited constituent power. The constituent 
power itself is not subject to the constitution, for it would 
thus cease to be unlimited and ontologically primary. Any 
limitation of constituent power would lead to contradictions, 
as by the imposition of such limitations it would no longer 
be a constituent power. The nation is in a way permanently 
embedded in the state of nature, for its will as a constituent 
power cannot be regulated and limited. In this sense, the will 
of the nation has an absolute primacy over the positive law, 
for it is its will that ‘is the source and supreme master of all 
positive law’25. Taking Sieyès' radical view, the limitation 
of constituent power of the nation would mean a loss of 
freedom by the nation and would open the way to 
                                                          
25 Ibid., p. 138. 
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establishing a dictatorship. From the thus outlined 
perspective the principles of liberal democracy appear as a 
limitation of ‘true democracy,’ as they not only introduce 
the inviolable rights of individuals, but also define the 
constitutional principles and rules governing the functioning 
of the political system (e.g. principles of the rule of law, 
lawmaking and amendment of the constitution26) which 
limit the freedom of the nation as a constituent power.  
The limitations introduced by constitutionalism are 
evident in the example of ‘the Federalist Papers’, where the 
possibility of direct rule by the people is rejected thus 
differentiating the republican system (today's representative 
democracy) from direct democracy. ‘We may define – 
J. Madison writes – a republic to be, or at least may bestow 
that name on, a government which derives all its powers 
directly or indirectly from the great body of the people; and 
is administered by persons holding their offices during 
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behaviour’27. 
A republic differs from direct democracy particularly in two 
respects: ‘first, the delegation of the Government, in the 
latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest: 
secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere 
of country, over which the latter may be extended’28. 
A representative system is to provide both political 
                                                          
26 Liberal constitutionalism distinguishes ‘higher lawmaking’, i.e. the law 
established in a particular form whose change also requires maintenance of a 
specific mode of procedure, that is different and more demanding than ‘normal 
lawmaking’. Cf. B. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, The 
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 99, No. 3, 1989, pp. 461 et seq., B. Ackerman, We the 
People. Foundations, Cambridge–London 1995, pp. 6 et seq. Cf. also J. Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, New York 1993, pp. 231-233. 
27 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist with The 
Letters of „Brutus”, ed. T. Ball, Cambridge 2003, p. 182. 
28 Ibid., p. 44. 
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legitimacy of the political authorities of choice, as well as a 
means of resolving conflicts between competing interests 
and views functioning in a complex society. Therefore it 
assumes pluralism as a fundamental characteristic of 
a society. ‘As long as the reason of man continues fallible, 
and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be 
formed. As long as the connection subsists between his 
reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will 
have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former 
will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves’29. 
The formation of the so-called factions30 is to a certain 
extent natural, with manifold causes behind it and the main 
one being the uneven distribution of property. Economic 
inequalities and the related conflicts of interest are one of 
the major sources of their emergence. ‘The regulation of 
these various and interfering interests forms the principal 
task of modern Legislation, and involves the spirit of party 
and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of 
Government’31. Legislation and the system of 
representation would constitute forms of conflict resolution, 
and thus a specific form of mediation between contradictory 
interests and the pursuit of possibly consensual legislative 
resolutions. In this context, a particularly important issue is 
connected with safeguarding against the dominance of a 
                                                          
29 Ibid., p. 41. Cf. the so-called ‘burdens of judgement’, which cause a discord 
and diversity of opinions to be a cardinal property of a free democratic society, 
J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 54-58. 
30 ‘By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a 
majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community’, Alexander Hamilton, 
James Madison, John Jay, The Federalist..., p. 41. 
31 Ibid., p. 42. 
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single majority faction that could pursue its interests without 
greater restrictions. According to Madison, in a direct 
democracy it is practically impossible to safeguard the rights 
of the minority against the majority. The limitation of 
factional claims, on the other hand, may take place in a 
republican, i.e. a representative system. It is therefore 
necessary to protect both the rights of citizens as well as 
republican institutions and principles. ‘It is of great 
importance in a republic, not only to guard the society 
against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of 
the society against the injustice of the other part. Different 
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If 
a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the 
minority will be insecure’32. The mechanisms of dividing 
and balancing the powers as well as the system of guarantee 
and protection of the rights of an individual, both resulting 
from assigning a special role and legal importance to the 
constitution, in a sense restrict the freedom of a democratic 
formation of political will, since it cannot violate 
constitutional principles and rights. Thus, the constitution 
forms a specific kind of a ‘higher law’, which can only be 
modified in a special mode33. Assuming that the democratic 
‘will of the nation’ is diverse, meeting of the legal 
requirements for an amendment or establishment of a new 
constitution is not simple. As a result, forms, procedures, 
and restrictions on the democratic decision-making process 
are more or less ‘rigidly’ normalised in the constitution as a 
‘higher law’. A question arises as to whether such a 
‘limitation’ should be interpreted as the dominance of a 
                                                          
32 Ibid., p. 254. 
33 Cf. footnote 26. 
T h e  D e m o c r a t i c  P a r a d o x  R e v i s i t e d …  | 23 
liberal element over a democratic one34, or whether the 
relation between them may be perceived through the 
category of interdependence?35 
From the perspective of the theory that democracy 
‘simply’ means participation and self-determination, any 
regulation of their expression in the form of representative 
institutions will be associated with their ‘limitation’. Such 
an interpretation entails an irremovable conflict between 
democracy and liberalism (constitutionalism), as when the 
will of the nation is not absolute (unconditioned), it is 
impossible to speak of democracy. Constituent power, as A. 
Negri points out, is closely linked to democracy. 
‘Constituent power has been considered not only as an all-
powerful and expansive principle capable of producing the 
constitutional norms of any juridical system, but also as the 
subject of this production – an activity equally all-powerful 
and expansive’36. Constituent power is not only a principle 
of political power adopted in the form of the principle of 
sovereignty of the nation, but also an actual entity – 
constituent power is a political entity that in a certain way, 
intrinsically and without intermediaries, ‘produces’ the 
democratic politics. Hence, it constitutes not only an entity 
that establishes a democratic constitution, but a democratic 
policy in general while itself it ‘resists being 
                                                          
34 C. Schmitt points out that ‘a threefold division of powers, a substantial 
distinction between the legislative and the executive, the rejection of the idea 
that the plenitude of state power should be allowed to gather at any one point – 
all of this is in fact the antithesis of a democratic concept of identity. The two 
postulates are thus not simple equivalents’, C. Schmitt, The Crisis of 
Parliamentary Democracy, trans. E. Kennedy, Cambridge-London 2000, p. 36. 
35 Cf. J. Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of 
Contradictory Principles?, Political Theory, Vol. 29, No. 6, 2001, pp. 766-768. 
36 A. Negri, Insurgencies. Constituent Power and the Modern State, trans. M. 
Boscagli, Minneapolis-London 1999, p. 1. 
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constitutionalised’. Democratic constitutions may only 
declare the existence of such an entity in their content. 
Similarly – as Negri further argues – democracy as the 
‘theory of an absolute government’ (the sovereign will of 
the people) ‘resists being constitutionalised’, since 
‘constitutionalism is a theory of limited government and 
therefore a practice that limits democracy’37. There is a 
conflict between constitutionalism and democracy 
(constituent power): ‘constitutionalism poses itself as the 
theory and practice of limited government: limited by the 
jurisdictional control of administrative acts and, above all, 
limited through the organisation of constituent power by the 
law’38. Liberal constitutionalism forms a limitation of a 
radically democratic will and in this sense is undemocratic. 
Constitutionalism is in a way oriented on the past and 
preserves the already established system, whereas 
democracy (constituent power) is a creative and forward-
looking force, thus the conflict between them can be 
interpreted as a conflict between an unlimited creative 
power and a tendency to regulate and stabilise.  ‘Democracy 
means the omnilateral expression of the multitude, the 
radical immanence of strength, and the exclusion of any sign 
of external definition, either transcendent or transcendental 
and in any case external to this radical, absolute terrain of 
immanence. This democracy is the opposite of 
constitutionalism. Or better, it is the negation itself of 
constitutionalism as constituted power – a power made 
impermeable to singular modalities of space and time, and a 
machine predisposed not so much to exercising strength but, 
                                                          
37 Ibid., p. 2. 
38 Ibid., p. 10. 
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rather, to controlling its dynamics, its unchangeable 
dispositions of force. Constitutionalism is transcendence, 
but above all constitutionalism is the police that 
transcendence establishes over the wholeness of bodies in 
order to impose on them order and hierarchy. 
Constitutionalism is an apparatus that denies constituent 
power and democracy’39. Assuming the above 
understanding of democracy, all forms of indirect 
democracy, the rule of law, and the guarantee of individual 
rights are merely a form of wielding control over the 
‘democratic dynamics’. Where does this particular 
preoccupation of liberal constitutionalism with the 
limitations of political power and stability of the political 
system come from? According to B. Barber, liberal 
democracy is a theory that focuses on a conflict within the 
society, which is the main problem of the policy40, thus the 
fundamental postulates of liberalism stem from the attempts 
to deal with social and political discord. However, according 
to critics, because of it the hidden constructive forces of a 
society are underestimated, hence liberal democracy should 
be confronted with a different concept of democracy. 
‘Strong democracy is a distinctively modern form of 
participatory democracy. It rests on the idea of a self-
governing community of citizens who are united less by 
homogeneous interests than by civic education and who are 
made capable of common purpose and mutual action by 
virtue of their civic attitudes and participatory institutions 
rather than their altruism or their good nature’41. One could 
                                                          
39 Ibid., p. 322. 
40 B. R. Barber, Strong Democracy. Participatory Politics for a New Age, 
Berkeley-Los Angeles-London 2003, p. 5. 
41 Ibid., p. 117. 
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ask here whether the ‘productive forces of democracy’ 
operating within ‘participatory democracy’ without 
stabilising and limiting institutions are not in fact going to 
turn into a permanent conflict? Will the perpetual 
revolution, that the constituent power indeed is to follow 
Negri's interpretation, lead to the dominance over that part 
of society which is best organised as a ‘productive 
movement’? Will a completely unrestricted democratic 
participation not lead to the hegemony of the majority, and 
thus (similarly as the principle of unanimity) deprive the 
minority of the right of participation and consequently 
eliminate pluralism? 
 
4. Liberal ‘constitutional essentials’ of democratic 
constitution 
The answer to these questions does not have to be 
affirmative to demonstrate that liberalism constitutes an 
indispensable element of modern democracy. Indeed, the 
aim of political liberalism is to establish the basic principles 
of a democratic system that would provide all citizens with 
equal political subjectivity and enable the maintenance of 
democratic disputes on equal terms. It aims towards the 
formulation of basic principles underlying the system of 
constitutional democracy that would be adequate for a 
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society characterised by (reasonable42) pluralism43. Ch. 
Larmore defines the problems faced by the theory of 
liberalism as follows: (a) formulation of moral conditions 
for limiting political power (defined by the idea of a 
common good); (b) formulation of conditions under which 
people with different concepts of good would be able to live 
together in a political association44. The solution would 
consist in the formulation of a ‘minimal moral conception’ 
that expresses the idea of a common good that could be 
supported by a broad spectrum of doctrines and conceptions 
of a good life. Such an idea would be neutral in relation to 
various worldviews, which does not mean that it would be 
neutral in moral terms45.  
Therefore, what kind of an idea does liberalism 
propose as a ‘minimal moral conception’ for the democratic 
                                                          
42 ‘The diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and 
moral doctrines found in modern democratic societies is not a mere historical 
condition that may soon pass away; it is a permanent feature of the public culture 
of democracy’, J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 36. Reasonable pluralism does 
not only mean that people accept various holistic doctrines within the 
democratic system but that such doctrines are also reasonable, although 
individuals may perceive only their own ‘doctrines’ as ‘true or right’, cf. J. 
Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, [in:] J. Cohen, Philosophy, 
Politics, Democracy: Selected Essays, Cambridge Massachusetts 2009, p. 53. 
43 ‘Liberalism assumes that in a constitutional democratic state under modern 
conditions there are bound to exist conflicting and incommensurable 
conceptions of the good’. J. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not 
Metaphysical, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 3, 1985, p. 245. 
‘Liberalism as a political doctrine supposes that there are many conflicting and 
incommensurable conceptions of the good, each compatible with the full 
rationality of human persons, so far as we can ascertain within a workable 
political conception of justice. As a consequence of this supposition, liberalism 
assumes that it is a characteristic feature of a free democratic culture that a 
plurality of conflicting and incommensurable conceptions of the good are 
affirmed by its citizens’. Ibid., p. 248. 
44 Ch. Larmore, Political Liberalism, Political Theory, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1990, p. 
340–341. 
45 Cf. Ibid., p. 341. 
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system? As claimed by R. Dworkin, every coherent political 
programme contains two elements: ‘constitutive political 
positions that are valued for their own sake, and derivative 
positions that are valued as strategies, as means of achieving 
the constitutive positions’46. It is possible to speak of a 
continuity of a political doctrine, if the transformations that 
it is undergoes affect the derivative positions and not the 
constitutive ones. In other words, constitutive positions 
remain the same, whereas the means towards their 
achievement change along with social, economic or other 
changes. Liberalism shares numerous constitutive principles 
with other doctrines (such as the principle of freedom which 
is shared with conservatism), however it assigns them a 
different rank. The constitutive position of liberalism 
consists in the defined concept of equality47. It is possible to 
distinguish between the principle of treating the citizens ‘as 
equals’ (in terms of being entitled to the same care and 
respect) and treating them ‘equally’ (in the same way), 
however ‘equally’ does not always mean the same as the 
expression ‘as equals’ (for instance, a tax can be imposed 
equally on all citizens, but it does not mean that they are 
treated as equals, as the cost incurred by citizens with the 
lowest income is relatively higher than the burden placed on 
high-income citizens), therefore the first meaning is 
constitutive whilst the other derivative48. What really 
distinguishes liberalism from other political doctrines is the 
thesis that individuals should be treated ‘as equals’ 
(neutrally), and thus regardless of their understanding of 
                                                          
46 R. Dworkin, Liberalism, [in:] R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, New York 
1985, p. 184. 
47 Cf. Ibid., p. 188. 
48 Cf. Ibid., p. 190. 
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good (or life goals, what a good life is to them)49. In order 
to ensure equal treatment of individuals with different 
concepts of the good, preferences, or aspirations, it is 
necessary to establish institutions ensuring the stable 
functioning of a diverse society (e.g. representative 
democratic institutions, free market, redistribution 
mechanisms), which on the one hand recognise the 
inequalities arising from the diversity of goals and concepts 
of the good, whilst on the other hand eliminate arbitrary and 
unjustified inequalities, thus treating citizens ‘as equals’.  
A liberal protection of citizens' treatment ‘as equals’ 
by social and political institutions consists of a system of 
guaranteed rights and freedoms. From such a perspective, 
liberalism is associated with the recognition of diversity 
resulting from an equal treatment of persons pursuing 
different concepts of the good, different goals, and having 
varying interests. The existence of a universal system of 
rights and freedoms would guarantee the treatment of such 
persons as equals. Thus it is the equality that constitutes the 
‘minimal moral concept’, which is the basic principle of a 
political system that affirms pluralism. B. Ackerman lists 
six elements of response of political liberalism to the fact of 
pluralism: (a) political principles should not be ‘hostage’ to 
one of the many ideas of a good life operating in a society; 
(b) political liberalism adopts such a strategy of justification 
of political principles as could be adopted by representatives 
of various comprehensive doctrines; (c) political liberalism 
strives to remain independent of holistic philosophical 
                                                          
49 Cf. Ibid., pp. 191–192. This would distinguish liberalism from conservatism, 
which connects equal treatment with a specific concept of the good, similarly to 
socialism. 
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doctrines and base itself on its own principles and ideas; (d) 
emphasises the primary commitment of maintaining public 
dialogue between the different parties; (e) introduces the 
principle of conversational constraint – until a citizen makes 
a specific argument publicly, it cannot be deemed 
convincing; (f) before particular institutions of the basic 
structure become legitimate, they must undergo a rigorous 
test of a public dialogue of free and equal citizens50. From 
the thus outlined perspective, the basic principles of 
constitutional democracy and its basic institutions are not 
treated as ‘granted’, but as the subject of a consensus of free 
and equal citizens, reached as a result of a public 
deliberation of arguments in favour of them (an ideal 
representation of such a public debate is the idea of an initial 
situation). ‘Problem of political liberalism is: How is it 
possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by 
reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines? Put another way: How is it possible 
that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines may live together and all affirm the political 
conception of a constitutional regime?’51. 
According to J. Raz, the essence of political 
liberalism, in relation to the fact of pluralism, is a specific 
‘epistemic abstinence’: it should not refer to the question of 
the truth or falsehood of comprehensive doctrines professed 
by citizens52. If it were to be a true theory, it would have to 
                                                          
50 B. Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 91, No. 
7, 1994, pp. 365-368. 
51 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xviii. 
52 Cf. J. Raz, Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence, Philosophy 
& Public Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1990, p. 4. 
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be based on a certain comprehensive doctrine accepting 
certain fundamental positions as justified, however then it 
would not be a theory formulating the ‘minimal concept of 
principles’, it could not serve as a theory adequate for the 
democratic system characterized by the fact of pluralism. 
Therefore, the main problem of political liberalism is seen 
in the principles which cause that democratic political power 
to be legitimised by virtue of such principles. ‘We ask: when 
is that power appropriately exercised? That is, in the light of 
what principles and ideals must we, as free and equal 
citizens, be able to view ourselves as exercising that power 
if our exercise of it is to be justifiable to other citizens and 
to respect their being reasonable and rational?’53. In 
response to this question, J. Rawls formulates the ‘liberal 
principle of legitimacy’: ‘our exercise of political power is 
fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with 
a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and 
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason’54. Political liberalism points to the particular 
importance of a constitution in the democratic system. The 
legitimisation of political power occurs when it respects the 
‘constitutional essentials’, i.e. the principles expressing the 
idea of democratic equality, which can be accepted by 
citizens in the conditions of pluralism. Rawls indicates that 
from the point of view of political liberalism, a democratic 
constitution should contain two elements that are 
understood as ‘constitutional essentials’: 
                                                          
53 J. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 137. 
54 Ibid., p. 137. 
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a) fundamental principles that specify the general 
structure of government and the political process: 
the powers of the legislature, executive and the 
judiciary; the scope of majority rule; and 
b) equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that 
legislative majorities are to respect: such as the right 
to vote and participate in politics, liberty of 
conscience, freedom of thought and of association, 
as well as the protections of the rule of law’55.  
These are not equivalent elements in the sense that their 
meaning is the same. The second important element of a 
constitution is contained in the very sense of a constitution 
of a democratic state, while the first is related to the 
pragmatism of exercising political power. If the rights and 
freedoms contained in the second constituent of the 
constitution are preserved, it can be presumed that the way 
of organising the power respects the principles of 
democracy, whereas even the most rational organisation of 
a system of political power cannot be considered democratic 
in the absence of political rights of participation and 
fundamental freedoms of the individual. Without ensuring 
fundamental subjectivity we cannot speak of free and equal 
citizens, and when this is the case we cannot speak of 
democracy either. Equal rights of participating in the 
democratic process constitute a sort of democratic ‘rights of 
rights’56. Liberal democracy defined by the above 
constitutional essentials would be a system functioning 
                                                          
55 Ibid., p. 227. 
56 Cf. J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Oxford-New York 2004, p. 156, cf. 
also chapter 11. 
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according to the ‘logic of equality’57. In other words, with 
the constitutionalisation of political rights, citizens acquire 
political subjectivity and are able to establish a real political 
entity. Regardless of whether the ontological primacy of 
constituent power is recognised before constituted power, it 
is only with the constitutionalisation of equal rights of 
participation in the democratic process that the civic 
subjectivity assumes a real and normative meaning. In such 
an interpretation the principle of liberalism is linked to 
democracy, as the liberal rights of political participation 
may only be realised in a democratic system, whilst 
democracy itself is based on these very rights58.  
                                                          
57 Cf. R. A. Dahl, On Democracy. p. 10. Rosanvallon points to equality as a 
constitutive idea for a democratic society: ‘I therefore propose to begin by 
reexamining the spirit of equality as it was forged in the American and French 
Revolutions. Equality was then understood primarily as a relation, as a way of 
making a society, of producing and living in common. It was seen as a 
democratic quality and not merely as a measure of the distribution of wealth. 
This relational idea of equality was articulated in connection with three other 
notions: similarity, independence, and citizenship. Similarity comes under the 
head of equality as equivalence: to be ‘alike’ is to have the same essential 
properties, such that remaining differences do not affect the character of the 
relationship. In dependence is equality as autonomy; it is defined negatively as 
the absence of subordination and positively as equilibrium in exchange. 
Citizenship involves equality as participation, which is constituted by 
community membership and civic activity. Consequently, the project of equality 
as relationship was interpreted in terms of a world of like human beings (or 
semblables, as Alexis de Tocqueville would say), a society of autonomous 
individuals, and a community of citizens’, P. Rosanvallon, The Society of Equals, 
p. 10. 
58 If we assumed the above stance ‘illiberal democracy’ would be internally 
contradictory, cf. also J. W. Müller, What is Populism?, Philadelphia 2016, 
chapter 2. Cf. Habermas's attempt to combine democracy and liberalism, i.e. 
presentation of their relationship as ‘non-paradoxical’, J. Habermas, 
Constitutional Democracy..., pp. 776-778. ‘The sought-for internal relation 
between popular sovereignty and human rights consists in the fact that the 
system of rights states precisely the conditions under which the forms of 
communication necessary for the genesis of legitimate law can be legally 
institutionalized’, J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a 
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The close relationship between fundamental 
freedoms and the democratic political procedure causes 
fundamental rights and freedoms to be interpreted by Rawls 
as an expression of the principle of equal participation. It is 
to express the idea of civic equality with the condition for 
its realisation consisting in ensuring equal rights and 
freedoms to citizens. ‘Since the constitution is the 
foundation of the social structure, the highest-order system 
of rules that regulates and controls other institutions, 
everyone has the same access to the political procedure that 
it sets up. When the principle of participation is satisfied, all 
have the common status of equal citizen’59. An ideal form 
of demonstrating such an inclusive procedure of 
establishing the constitution is the social agreement: each 
party has an equal voice in the procedure for the 
establishment of the system. On the lower level of 
deliberation, i.e. the level of participation in a ‘regular’ 
political process, the principle of participation ‘requires that 
all citizens have equal rights to take part in, and to determine 
the outcome of, the constitutional process that establishes 
the laws with which they are to comply with’60. Of course, 
within the context of a modern democratic system this 
occurs in the form of representative democracy, which 
guarantees the citizens the right to participate in the form of 
specific electoral rights, parliamentary law, party system, 
expression of opinions, etc. 
 By emphasising the importance of constitutional 
rights of participation in the political process, political 
                                                          
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. W. Rehg, Cambridge 1996, p. 
104, cf. pp. 118-131. 
59 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge 1999, p. 200. 
60 Ibid., p. 194. 
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liberalism in a way refers to the republican affirmation of 
politics as an area in which the specific human nature is 
fulfilled61. H. Arendt divides fundamental human activities 
into labour, work, and action. In general, labour is linked to 
the biological side of humanity, work is an expression of the 
creative side (production of the ‘artificial’ world of things), 
action is a form of activity, which occurs exclusively 
‘between people’ and therefore has a specifically social 
character (intersubjective)62. ‘Human plurality, the basic 
condition of both action and speech, has the twofold 
character of equality and distinction. If men were not equal, 
they could neither understand each other and those who 
came before them, nor plan for the future and foresee the 
needs of those who will come after them. If men were not 
distinct, each human being distinguished from any other 
who is, was, or will ever be, they would need neither speech 
nor action to make themselves understood’63. The area of 
specifically human matters is situated in the ‘interpersonal’ 
sphere, where action constitutes the proper form of activity. 
It occurs in the public sphere and is concerned with public 
affairs. The rights of political participation allow for an 
occurrence of a specifically human form of activity, and the 
value of the constitution is that it organises a space in which 
various forms of human activity may be manifested. Thus, 
it allows fulfilment of this element of human nature that is 
specific for it (i.e. distinguishes humans from other beings), 
                                                          
61 Of course, it does not issue strong ethical claims concerning citizens' 
preferences of the public good, cf. Habermas's criticism of republicanism and 
narrowly understood liberalism (limited to private rights) in Three Normative 
Models of Democracy, [in:] Democracy and Difference. Contesting the 
Boundaries of the Political, ed. S. Benhabib, Prncteon 1996, pp. 21-23, 26, 29. 
62 Cf. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago-London 1998, pp. 7 et seq. 
63 Ibid., pp. 175-176. 
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namely acting in a public forum and for public purposes. In 
such an interpretation liberal constitutionalism provides the 
principles by which a specific form of human activity may 
take place according to the principles of democratic 
citizenship and social co-operation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
According to Mouffe, a specific value of liberal democracy 
is that ‘it creates a space in which this confrontation is kept 
open, power relations are always being put into question and 
no victory can be final’64. For modern liberal democracy, 
the acceptance of pluralism is of a constitutive meaning. It 
relates not only to the very fact of diversity, but to the 
recognition of diversity as a desirable state and awarding 
equal rights to all persons. Properly understood political 
liberalism65 should ‘cherish’ such pluralism, thus allowing 
for the widest possible discussion and public debate and 
questioning of both current affairs (e.g. ordinary legislation 
or government decisions) and the very bases of the political 
system66. This means that liberalism indeed enters into 
a conflict with democracy when it limits pluralism by 
                                                          
64 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 15. 
65 This article is concerned with the theory of liberal constitutionalism and not 
with political practice, therefore this theory can also serve as a criticism of a 
practice that is called ‘liberal’ yet does not pursue fundamental liberal ideas. 
66 ‘Within our tradition there has been a consensus that the discussion of general 
political, religious, and philosophical doctrines can never be censored. Thus the 
leading problem of the freedom of political speech has focused on the question 
of subversive advocacy, that is, on advocacy of political doctrines an essential 
part of which is the necessity of revolution, or the use of unlawful force, and the 
incitement thereto as a means of political change’, J. Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, p. 343. ‘To repress subversive advocacy is to suppress the discussion 
of these reasons, and to do this is to restrict the free and informed public use of 
our reason in judging the justice of the basic structure and its social policies. 
And thus the basic liberty of freedom of thought is violated’, Ibid., p. 346. 
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formal restrictions in the possibility of participating in 
public discourse67. ‘In a democratic policy, conflicts and 
confrontations, far from being a sign of imperfection, 
indicate that democracy is alive and inhabited by 
pluralism’68. Rawls's ‘constitutional essentials’ should 
therefore allow citizens to participate equally in public 
discourse regardless of their political power. In other words, 
they should make the democratic system open to change and 
re-interpretation both in terms of common legislation as well 
as with regard to basic principles. However, such changes 
should take place while being embedded within the 
framework of democratic principles and not violating them, 
therefore an actual (and not only declared) refusal to 
recognise the civic equality of certain classes of citizens 
would breach both liberalism and democracy. Taking into 
account the pluralism of a democratic society, awarding all 
citizens with equal rights of political participation makes the 
content of democratic legislation variable or open to change. 
C. Lefort argues that democracy is connected with a process 
of calling things into question, which is endless and is a 
presumed part of social practice69. If various aspirations and 
conflicts cannot be resolved within the framework of a 
symbolic practice of questioning things, movements seeking 
to ‘define society’, making it ‘one’ may occur, which on the 
                                                          
67 In the above interpretation liberalism is not far from Mouffe's radical and 
pluralist democracy, i.e. the political project assuming the existence of conflict 
and violence, calling for the establishment of a group of institutions that would 
‘limit and contest’ dominance and violence, yet would not eliminate conflict and 
diversity, Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 22. Cf. Ch. Mouffe, 
Agonistics. Thinking the World Politically, London-New York 2013, chapter 1. 
68 Ch. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, p. 34. 
69 C. Lefort, Democracy and Political Theory, trans. D. Macey, Cambridge 
1988, p. 19. 
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other hand leads to totalitarianism. The functioning of a 
democracy depends on allowing an open ‘practice of 
questioning’ within the context of ‘an institutionalised 
conflict’. ‘The exercise of power is subject to the procedures 
of periodical redistributions. It represents the outcome of a 
controlled contest with permanent rules. This phenomenon 
implies an institutionalization of conflict. The locus of 
power is an empty place, it cannot be occupied - it is such 
that no individual and no group can be consubstantial with 
it – and it cannot be represented’70. A democratic-liberal 
constitution does not fill the said ‘empty place of power,’ 
but maintains an ‘institutionalisation of conflict’, thus 
ensuring an open and inclusive way of operating of the 
system, i.e. giving citizens an opportunity to participate in 
the ‘practice of questioning’ of the existing status quo ‘as 
equals’. If the above interpretation is correct, the democratic 
paradox is that democracy indeed needs liberal 
constitutionalism in order to function as an open and 
pluralistic system.  
.
                                                          
70 Ibid., p. 17. 
